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THE WAR IN KOSOVO:
FAILED LESSONS OF INCREMENTALISM
C. Boyden Gray*
I used to play basketball. I worry about height. I measure hotel
rooms by the height of the shower curtain and I have an ancestor
who served in Congress, actually, before the Civil War. He was six
feet, eight inches, which was tall for those days, and he, among other
things, ridiculed dueling to death in the State of North Carolina. He
was sort of an eccentric. My view is we ought to bring dueling back
as a substitute for the current "ethics" wars, which are very unpleas-
ant. Rather, we should just have duels-one shot and it is all over.
My ancestor was very tall, and he got into an argument once
with Senator Douglas of the Lincoln-Douglas debates,' who was
very short, you may recall, very short but cocky, and sure of himself.
Douglas gave gave my ancestor a choice of both weapon and place
for the duel that ensued after this dispute. And my ancestor said:
"Okay, if that is the way you want it--broad swords in the Potomac."
And he won by default because Douglas went under water first.
Speaking of Congress, though, I do think that they have an im-
portant role to play, and I am going to make some remarks that may
seem counterintuitive, but I will try to explain my point of view. I
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1. See generally 3 COLLECTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE HISTORICAL
LIBRARY (Edwin Ere Sparks ed., 1908).
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believe that in the absence of any direct threat to the national security
and without congressional authorization, the action in Kosovo was
probably not legally supported.
I do not think a court, for political question reasons, would ever
have a right to stop it. But, I believe it was and is very bad precedent
that undermines the lessons of the Gulf War, revives the mistakes of
Vietnam, and sets a bad course for inter-branch relationships, be-
cause the process that is used in the White House and the legal advi-
sors, the State Department and the Chiefs, and the Joint Chiefs and
the Defense Department to determine the legality, even if the court is
not going to oversee it, is important, and that process was degraded
by what happened.
Why does it matter, you may ask? What is the harm done? You
look at what happened. If a court is not to be involved, who cares?
What does it matter? Let me try to explain why the process point I
just made is important. I believe that the mistake of Vietnam was the
incrementalism that was involved, the failure to come to grips at the
outset with what was expected, and the lack of public buy-in, which
was always a problem.
Johnson never had the courage to call up the Reserves, which
would have posed the question about the war's authorization at the
outset when the build-up started. He decided that he did not want to
do that and instead used the slow drip, drip of the draft, which got
him in huge trouble in the long term, even if in the short run it al-
lowed him to escalate. But appropriate force was never applied to
win the war. It was always the graduated approach with Johnson,
picking out the targets in the Map Room or wherever he was, or in
the Situation Room of the White House. The generals were never
allowed to do what they needed to do in order to win the war.
I believe the Vietnam War could have been won if the U.S. Re-
serves had been activated at the outset and had gone in and done a
landing in Hanoi, the way it was done in Korea at the landing at
Inch'on. I believe that if troops had been sent over there in an up-
front manner with an explanation to the American public, we would
have had a different outcome. Instead, we had a very unpopular
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drawn-out war that discredited the military for almost an entire gen-
eration.2
Now, along comes the Gulf War. I believe that President Bush
thought that he was rectifying this wrong done by Vietnam, not just
for the process, but also for the integrity of the military itself. And
out of this came what we know now, I guess, as the Powell Doctrine,
which is, you figure out what your mission is, then you amass the
force necessary to achieve it, and then you go in and do it? The
military has a clear mission and you are not going to get involved
with mission creep. You are not going to get involved with incre-
mentalism. Your mission at the outset is to win what the politicians
have set as your goaL And it went very well and very quickly.
The President wanted Congress in on what happened. He had to
fight to get Congress to act, but he wanted a united government to
support the troops and he wanted Congress in because if the war
went sour, he wanted them to help cushion the blow, and if it went
well, he wanted to hold those who voted against him accountable.
The result was a very, very, quick war, certainly as compared with
Vietnam.
Now, in Kosovo, by contrast, there was no public debate about
what happened. There was this aura of incrementalism, of graduated
bombing beginning with a committee of seventeen nations picking
over each target-not a way to win war. We backed into it. We may
have triggered a lot more killing and a lot more ethnic cleansing than
was necessary. The jury will probably always be out on that. But,
there are a lot of people who believe, and I am with them, that had
the troops been amassed or at least the bombing been clearly under-
stood, including its goals at the outset, Milosevic would have been
scared, would have backed off, and would not have done what he ul-
timately did do.4
2. See generally HERBERT Y. SCHANDLER, THE UNMAKING OF A
PRESIDENT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND VIETNAM 194-96 (1977) (discussing the
disenchanted feeling of the American people with the Vietnam War and its
strategies).
3. See Cohn L. Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, FOREIGN AFF.,
Winter 1992-93, at 32, 39.
4. See Michael Mandelbaum, A Perfect Failure: NATO's War Against
Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 2, 5.
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There is a devastating critique of the war by Michael Mandel-
baum that "the war, as a deliberate act of policy, [was] a perfect fail-
ure. The humanitarian goal NATO sought--the prevention of suf-
fering-was not achieved by the bombing. .. ."5 As a political goal
the air campaign was made possible in favor of the Albanian Koso-
vars independence.6 "NATO not only did not seek but actively op-
posed the campaign. ' ,7 Mandelbaum goes on to say that the war in
Kosovo did great damage to our relationships with Russia and with
China.8
So the precedent is, I believe, a very bad one, reversing the les-
sons of the Gulf War, going back again to the mistakes of Vietnam.
The reality is, the White House never tried to justify what it did to
the public, which it would have had to do if it had had to go to Con-
gress and get an affinmative vote. I do not believe that the White
House could have justified it and therefore, I believe, it would not
have done it. Remember that even in the Gulf War, U.S. Reserves
were called upon at the outset, as of course eventually happened in
Korea.9 The U.S. Reserves should have been activated in the begin-
ning in Kosovo in a way that was part of a call-up.' 0 I think, again,
that would have triggered public debate, but that never occurred at
the outset.
There is one little anecdote about the Reserves. We had a big
rally in the East Room to try and generate support for the resolution
that ultimately authorized the Gulf War. A lot of congressmen came
in. I cannot remember whether Congressman Kucinich was there or
not, but it was a big crowd. As I was coming out of the room, I
found myself with General Powell going down the stairs, and I re-
minded him because there had been some discussions of Reserve
call-up as part of the authorization, that MacArthur had refused to
use Army regulars for the landing at Inch'on and had instead insisted
on using Marine Corps Reserves to do the landing because the Army




8. See id. at 7.
9. See Exec. OrderNo. 12,743, 56 Fed. Reg. 2661 (Jan. 18, 1991).
10. See Mandelbaum, supra note 4, at 7-8.
11. See JOHN W. SPANIER, THE TRUMAN-MACARTHUR CONTROVERSY AND
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hear this in front of other officers and told me in jest to keep quiet.
But it is true that MacArthur insisted on using Marine Reserves who
did not even have MI rifles. They had Springfield rifles first issued
in 1898.
I do not believe that either the War Powers Resolution 12 or the
contemporaneous budget appropriation authorized or is cover for
what happened in the Balkans. I do not think any president has ever
agreed to the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, and I
do not believe that the supplemental appropriation, which ostensibly
provided money, actually flowed dollar for dollar into the Balkans.
In fact, the money that was used to prosecute the bombing at the out-
set came from other accounts in the Pentagon, which were simply re-
plenished by the supplemental authorization.
Walter Dellinger, the former Office of Legal Counsel Chief and
Acting Assistant Attorney General in the Clinton administration, has
made the point that Kosovo was the first violation of the notion that
troops could not be committed in a hostile situation beyond sixty
days without congressional authorization.13 I believe that Dellinger
is right about that, and I think that it is, again, a very bad precedent.
Now, Lou Fisher had argued that President Bush's actions in the
Gulf War were no different than Kosovo and no different than Viet-
nam.14
People seem to want to take the view that once President Bush
got international authority, that the coalition together got the UN
resolutions, and he then felt he had done all he needed to do, and that
somehow the congressional authorization was forced on him by
Senator Mitchell. The reverse is true. He bad to force Mitchell into
agreeing to give him a vote. It took him about three months to get
Mitchell to do it, and it was a struggle all the way.
THE KOREAN WAR 78-81 (1959).
12. H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong. (1973) (enacted).
13. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Walter Del-
linger, After the Cold War: Presidential Power and the Use of Afilita)y Force,
50 U. MLmI L. REv. 107, 116-19 (1995).
14. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Pow-
ers, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 931, 964 (1999); Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Con-
gress: Presidents Acting Under the U.N. and NATO, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1237, 1264 (1997).
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Congressman Aspen, now deceased, who was a great help on
the House side, said: "I can guarantee you a win in the House. You
will have Solarz, Danny Fascell, and me with you."' 5 Aspen further
said, "I cannot speak for the Senate, but I think we will give you
enough momentum to win."' 6 Well, it was just barely enough. I
think we won by one or two votes, but at the end of the day, Secre-
tary Dick Cheney was very, very grateful for the vote, saying on
more than one occasion that this was the single most important part
of winning the war.
Now, the administration and the country ultimately did well in
Kosovo. There were no casualties. It had no measurable impact on
the U.S. economy the way Vietnam did. It is not clear whether it had
any impact on the economy of any other important place. The Bal-
kans are not, you know, Silicon Valley. And we have finally had
free elections there. But, I think the precedent does matter, and if we
are not careful, we will see this, I am afraid, repeated again.
I repeat that the process by which lawyers in the executive
branch agonize over deployment of troops in hostile situations is a
very important process, and it is engaged in great seriousness with
the expectation the courts will not intervene.' 7 The process governs
inter-branch relations, and to undermine that process is to undermine
a discipline that I think is very, very important in the conduct of for-
eign policy. And I think, as a practical matter, if you are confronted
with having to ask Congress for authority because it is one of the
things you have to do in order to win the mission, then I do believe it
helps achieve that mission, as it did in the Gulf War.
I believe the lack of up-front confrontation with the issues po-
litically undermined the mission in Vietnam and led to the loss there.
It had a very real impact on the ultimate outcome, and that is more
important than whether or not you win or lose the issue in court,
which is not the issue here. But it can be outcome determinative. I
believe that this is a major lesson of Vietnam and the Gulf War,
which should not be lost, but runs the risk of being lost, by what
happened in Kosovo.
15. See generally J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DuKE L.J. 27, 43-
48 (1991).
16. See id.
17. See Dellinger, supra note 13, at 110-11.
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